Sex work and online platforms: what should regulation do? by Cowen, Nicholas & Colosi, Rachela
1 
 
Sex work and online platforms: what should regulation 
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Assess the impact of online platforms on the sex industry, focussing specifically on direct sex 
work, and evaluate what approaches to platform regulation is likely to align with the interests 
of sex workers. 
Design/methodology/approach 
A review of interdisciplinary conceptual and empirical literature on sex work combined with 
analysis of key issues using a transaction cost framework. 
Findings 
Online platforms generally make sex work safer. Regulation aimed at preventing platforms 
from serving sex workers is likely to harm their welfare.  
Research limitations/implications 
Regulation of online platforms should take great care to differentiate coercive sex from 
consensual sex work, and allow sex workers to experiment with governance mechanisms 
provided by entrepreneurs. 
Originality/value 
The paper demonstrates how a transactions costs approach to market behavior as applied to 
personal services like ridesharing can also shed light on the challenges that sex workers face, 
partly as a result of criminalisation, and the dangers of over-regulation. 
Introduction 
How should regulators approach the marketing and sale of sexual services on Internet 
platforms? This is an urgent and controversial question as workers in the sex industry 
are often among the least advantaged and most at risk of violence or deprivation. It is 
also a key way that technology entrepreneurs can become entangled with criminal 
law. One illustration is the U.S. federal government’s seizure of the company and 
website Backpage and conviction of its CEO in 2018 on human trafficking and 
money-laundering offences (Born, 2019). Concern about Backpage and similar 
businesses prompted the removal of some platform immunities from liability for 
content published on Internet platforms under section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act. Some scholars have used this example as part of a broader justification 
for reducing the immunities of third-party platforms in ways that may affect other 
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business areas as well freedom of expression on the Internet (Citron and Wittes, 
2018). 
Sex work is criminalised in most of the United States and is typically prohibited or 
heavily regulated in other countries in alignment with what we label a ‘suppression’ 
approach to policy (Phoenix, 2009; Wakefield and Brents, 2020; Weitzer, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the direct prosecution of sex workers on moral grounds is not as 
popular to implement as it once was. As a result, the contemporary rationale for an 
aggressive stance against platforms that facilitate sex work is that they function as a 
cover for sexual exploitation and human trafficking (Goldman, 2018; Otravec, 2014). 
The argument of this paper, by contrast, is that the prurient and stigmatised 
presentation of sex work in much public debate has led to a blurring of consensual 
sex work with a distinct problem of non-consensual sexual exploitation (Lerum and 
Brents, 2016; Chapman-Schmidt, 2019). This mistaken presentation of sex work has 
encouraged a confusing and ultimately harmful approach to platform regulation. 
Bringing both the lived experience of sex workers and systematic empirical research 
into consideration suggests that technology platforms help sex workers engage in 
self-protection. 
Whether defending or critiquing the role of technology platforms in facilitating sex 
work, scholars have tended to present the issue as a unique problem in need of 
specific legal solutions (See Sanders et al., 2017). However, considering the sex 
industry through a transaction cost framework suggest that many of the problems that 
sex workers face parallels the challenges of workers in legally permitted industries, 
especially personal services. The main complication is that because sex workers 
often operate either outside the law or at the periphery of what the law permits, 
ordinary entrepreneurs are deterred from supporting them while providing 
opportunity for governance and protection suppliers who are willing to use other 
illegal means such as violence (Kurtz et al., 2004; Sanders and Campbell, 2007; 
Vanwesenbeeck, 2017). As a result, decriminalisation would be more likely to 
improve the welfare of people participating in the sex work. 
This paper’s position is substantiated by reviewing empirical analyses of sex work 
from economics, sociology, and public health, and explaining the observed changes 
in terms of the transactions-costs framework found in new institutional economics. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, it gives an account of the development of 
Internet platform regulation and some points of contention surrounding the sex 
industry. Second, it explains different ways of conceptualising sex work and 
approaches to sex work regulation. Third, it explains the high transactions costs that 
sex workers face and the variety of ways that online platforms have helped to reduce 
them. It concludes by considering how public policy aiming to improve the welfare 
of sex workers should approach the regulation of online platforms and how this 
analysis relates to broader analysis of the determinants of labor conditions. 
Internet common carriers and their discontents 
Internet commerce and online expression has grown with the support of a relatively 
permissive legal framework oriented around Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act (CDA) (1996). The CDA was originally intended to prevent indecent and obscene 
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material (including written words) from reaching minors. The Supreme Court decision in 
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union1 (1997) restricted the scope of these provisions to 
prohibition of obscene materials, including images of child sexual abuse. It excluded indecent 
materials from direct government regulation on the grounds that their publication was 
protected by the First Amendment. This prevented the government from explicitly censoring 
most Internet speech. The provisions of Section 230, however, remained in place. The law 
treats Internet content providers as common carriers, conduits between parties, and thus 
responsible for the effective conveyance of information but generally not liable for the 
content. Protections extend not just to Internet Service Providers but also content providers 
such as search engines and social media platforms. 
Protections for internet service providers and content providers are not absolute. They are 
required to respond quickly to claims of copyright infringement by removing stolen and 
republished material. They must act rapidly to remove libellous material. Section 230 of the 
CDA also permits content providers to block material it judges to be offensive or obscene 
even if that material is protected by the First Amendment. Thus, Internet content suppliers are 
permitted to censor communications in a way for which there is not a direct parallel with 
telephone and mail services. 
This has produced a compromise, effective for the facilitation of the growth of Internet 
services in a way that is suitable for a variety of audiences including families and children 
(Kosseff, 2019). However, it has its controversies since it relies on delegating powers that the 
government itself is not permitted to exercise to private-sector common carriers. The 
government enables internet content providers to censor so long as they act in good faith but 
has been constrained from setting its own content guidance. Due to the global interconnected 
nature of the Internet, and the relative ease with which foreign firms can host content using 
providers based in the United States, this relatively permissive structure set a standard for 
legal protection for online publication that other regimes were incentivised to imitate, or risk 
losing commercial relevance. The Internet as we understand it today is arguably uniquely 
possible because of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
FOSTA-SESTA and Backpage 
The Internet’s functions have grown so that it represents not just a media content provider but 
also a critical forum for commerce and social expression. The role of platforms as censors of 
offensive political speech has led to accusations of bias from multiple perspectives. In 2019, 
President Donald Trump issued an executive order, with difficult to parse legal implications, 
requiring social media to be politically balanced when censoring content. It has also led to 
contestation over how far First Amendment provisions can extend to content that facilitates 
commerce. For example, Amazon.com has made several attempts to use Section 230 to claim 
immunity from advertising defective or dangerous products marketed by third parties (Doyer, 
2020; Citron and Wittes, 2018). 
In this context, the criminalisation of online platforms that facilitate sex work has attracted a 
rare bipartisan consensus. With the indecency route to regulation blocked by the Supreme 
Court, prosecutors have instead aggressively pursued firms who can be shown to benefit 
economically from sex work (Goldman, 2018). Although normally couched in terms of 
                                               
1 521 U.S. 844 
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protecting sex workers, and especially stopping human trafficking, in practice the facilitation 
of any sex work attracts the attention of state and federal police and prosecutors (Weitzer, 
2007, 2015). The popularity of this approach, and the tying of online advertising of sex work 
to immigration violations, prompted the passing into law in 2018 of FOSTA-SESTA. This 
explicitly extended liability for criminal prosecution to online platforms by removing their 
safe harbor immunities as common carriers. This was based on two bi-partisan bills, one 
initiated in the U.S. Senate (Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act), the other in the House of 
Representatives (Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act).   
The prosecution of Backpage illustrates the aggressive approach to online sex work 
regulation. Backpage was a classified listings site and the world’s most prominent platform 
for sex workers arranging meetings with clients until it was seized in April 2018 by the 
United States Department of Justice (Goldman, 2018). The launch of Backpage was 
prompted by the success of an older firm, Craigslist founded in 1994 as a classified emailing 
list that rapidly expanded into a website. Craigslist is a general classified listing website with 
popular sections on jobs, housing, used cars, second-hand items and events. It had a personals 
sections that at one point was a key point of contact for lesbian and gay meetings in regions 
without settled and public LGBTQ communities (Rostow, 2005).  Alongside this, it permitted 
‘erotic services’ listings until this was shut down after pressure from several state attorneys 
general (Reynolds, 2020). After FOSTA-SESTA was made law, Craigslist removed the 
personals section altogether in order to avoid any accusation of facilitating sex work even if 
they were explicitly advertised as mutual, non-commercial liaisons. 
Unlike Craigslist, Backpage took a different approach and relied on Section 230 to defend its 
business practices. This is how it became a dominant platform for sex work advertising 
listings on the Internet. A commercial research group estimate that at one point 70% of online 
revenue for erotic listings went to Backpage (Whittaker, 2012). Backpage and its business 
model were challenged in a series of lawsuits regarding advertisements from coerced sex 
workers, including minors. Despite winning several court cases, Backpage’s offices in Texas 
were eventually raided. CEO Carl Ferrer, as well as several other company employees, were 
arrested. The Electronic Frontier Foundation argued that at least some of the charges 
breached First Amendment protections (Cope, 2017). The charges and investigation 
devastated the platform. Ferrer pled guilty to facilitating prostitution and money laundering. 
Backpage, as a company, pled guilty to human trafficking. 
The nature of plea bargaining in the United States criminal justice system means that it is 
difficult to infer with confidence the guilt of these parties (Barkow, 2019; Surprenant and 
Brennan, 2020). Moreover, the shutdown of Backpage was felt as a substantial cost for sex 
workers who lost an important forum where they were able to control the conduct of their 
business (Witt, 2018; Tichenor, 2020; Q, 2018). This raises a set of controversial questions. 
Is criminalisation an appropriate response to platforms that facilitate sex work? What costs 
and benefits for sex workers and their customers are associated with the use of online 
platforms? What kind and extent of regulation do the social costs of sex work justify? As is 
now shown, much of this controversy lies in the different ways that activists and 
policymakers conceptualise and evaluate sex work. 
Conceptualising online sex work 
To provide some context for the article, it is necessary to explore the concept of sex work, 
and to situate it within online spaces. Although a very basic interest for a great many people, 
sex is remarkably hard to define in its totality. Posner (1998) controversially suggests that for 
most people, the act of sexual intercourse is typically preferred and that the variegated 
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alternatives function as substitutes that are associated with lower risks or costs to provide or 
procure. The proliferation of diverse sexual practices and orientations as the freedom to 
express sexual interests has grown suggests this is a substantial simplification. Instead, the 
sexual preferences that drive people are remarkably diverse. This means that sex work, sexual 
services or products provided in return for renumeration, represents a similarly vast array of 
practices that are often highly abstracted from acts of intercourse between people, and may 
not involve any physical stimulation at all. For this reason, scholars often distinguish between 
‘direct’ sex work, which involves intimate bodily interaction aimed at sexual relief, and 
‘indirect’ sex work that includes a wide array of services such as erotic dancing, fetish 
performances, pornography production, phone and text-based sex chat and, increasingly, live-
Internet performances (Sanders et al., 2018, 2017).    
Traditionally, sex work is often depicted as gendered, with women portrayed as the service 
providers and men as the consumers (Davidson, 2002; Jeffreys, 2009). However, more 
recently, scholars have challenged this, suggesting that it essentialises sex work, and 
oversimplifies the sex industry, which inevitably influences policy decisions in the regulation 
of sex work (Kingston and Smith, 2020). People who engage with sexual services, including 
those who provide the service and consume it, are diverse and include members from 
LGBTQ+ communities, as well as Cisgendered men and women (Logan, 2010; Smith and 
Attwood, 2013; Smith et al., 2015). With such a diverse profile, political decisions regarding 
the regulation of sex work should consider the different experiences and needs of those 
engaging with sex markets (Kingston and Smith, 2020).  
The practice of sex work continues to move online, with scholars contending that most sexual 
services involve some level of online interaction (McLean, 2015; Pitcher, 2015; Sanders et 
al., 2016, 2017); potentially increased by the recent lockdown conditions imposed in response 
to the Covid-19 epidemic. Moreover, the advertising of sexual services and practices of sex 
workers are predominantly web-based, which is clearly evidenced in the reduction of face-to-
face services (Sanders et al., 2016, 2017; Brooks-Gordon et al., 2015). Despite this, policy 
continues to focus on regulating face-to-face sex work, largely ignoring the advancement of 
online sexual services and advertising (Sanders et al., 2017); this to some extent is indicative 
of misinformation about sex markets (Kingston and Smith, 2020), but equally reflects some 
of the challenges of regulating online spaces (McKee et al., 2015). Where the regulation of 
online platforms has been attempted, as discussed later in this article, adult content has often 
been censored, and in some cases prohibited, by internet service providers and by site 
conveners. A notable example, of restricting adult content can be identified in the changes 
imposed by the owners of Tumblr prohibiting any sexual content. This disrupted several 
communities (including sex work workers) who used this site to express and advertise their 
sexuality (Colosi and Lister, 2019). 
Different models of sex work regulation 
While scholars agree that the sex industry has expanded significantly (even become 
‘mainstream’) (Brents and Sanders, 2010; Jeffreys, 2009), there is substantial disagreement 
over the normative implications of sex work and whether policy should aim to ensure safety 
and consent or actively supressed (Phoenix, 2009). McKenzie and Tullock (1975) explain sex 
work in terms of the different demand and supply schedules between individuals and, on 
average, between men and women (cf. Baumeister and Vohs, 2004). Although McKenzie and 
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Tullock do not take a normative standpoint, the implication is that the emergence of sex work 
can be explained out of mutual interest rather than coercion. Accounts from some current and 
former sex workers suggest this is indeed often the case (Magnanti, 2013). A classical liberal 
approach to the social morality of commerce posits that anything that informed, consenting 
adults are permitted to do for free are also presumptively permitted to sell (Brennan and 
Jaworski, 2016). According to this liberal view, the freedom to participate in sex work 
follows from a commitment to sexual and economic autonomy. 
There are many critical perspectives on liberalism. Within the debate over sex work, the most 
prominent is radical feminism. Radical feminism proposes that patriarchy, male domination 
of women, is a pervasive feature of modern societies, including all that are premised on a 
supposed liberal capitalism (Pateman, 1989). Men’s ‘liberal’ socio-economic freedom 
requires the subordination of women. In this context, the notion that women can consent to 
(heterosexual) sex is questioned, if not outright rejected (See Chapkis, 1997). Refusals to 
participate in sex are silenced; women’s consent to sex is either presumed or ignored as sex 
from women is considered a right (Langton, 2009). Although several radical feminists are 
critical of all forms of heterosexual activity that take place within existing societies (See 
Dworkin, 1987; Kitzinger, 1992), sex work, or prostitution as is the preferred label (Barry, 
1995; Jeffreys, 2009), is all the more insidious because it relies on both actual violence in the 
industry and the subtle coercion of poverty and social marginalisation. 
The highly divergent evaluations of the nature of sex work in commercial societies translates 
into similarly varied approaches to regulating sex work, that can be divided into suppressive 
or permissive models. The different models are rarely exclusively implemented and 
frequently vary by local jurisdiction. A public policy framework may prohibit certain types of 
sex work while licensing or simply ignoring other kinds. 
Suppression models 
Although explicitly prohibitionist policy is not so prominent in contemporary policy 
discussion, it was highly influential in establishing many legal frameworks that have 
persisted into the 21st century. In most parts of the United States, sex work is criminalised 
under various state laws (Wakefield and Brents, 2020). In the United Kingdom, sex work 
itself is legal but many practices used to facilitate it, including public solicitation and 
establishing a shared workplace (or brothel) is criminalised (Sanders et al., 2018).  
Sex work has often been treated as a form of vagrancy or part of generic anti-social activity 
in traditional legal systems. More systematic attempts at suppression through legal 
codification of sex work emerged in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Initially, laws regulating 
sex work tended to be premised on the containment of contagious diseases (Sanders et al., 
2018). But the justifications for prohibition soon took on a more explicitly moralised form 
(Weitzer, 2009). In the United States, the Progressive movement spearheaded this approach 
to reform. Progressives endorse what has subsequently been identified as a Wilsonian view of 
government as a powerful agent that should be harnessed to achieve a broad conception of 
the good (Ostrom, 2008), as well as an expansive notion of the police power of the states to 
make law to improve the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people.  
There were several ideological sources of the Progressive movement. A revived Christian 
religious fervour, in reaction to modernity, played an important role especially in policies 
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aimed at temperance which were hostile to alcohol consumption and sexual license. A moral 
panic surrounding ‘white slavery’, driven by exaggerated stories of traffic in women across 
state borders, inspired the Mann Act of 1910, which blurred the distinction between 
consensual and non-consensual sexual activity (Russo, 2020, p.322). However, there were 
also justifications that drew on scientific discourses, such as eugenics. Some policymakers 
were concerned with  maintaining the integrity of the family and ensuring women remained 
chaste for marriage in order to maintain racial purity (Kevles, 1999).  
Although, in many respects, hostile to individual women’s freedom, the movement was also 
aligned with expanding women’s suffrage and some women played a significant public role 
driving Progressive issues. Political voice was heavily weighted to women who were 
perceived to play a respectable role in society and the family. Reasons for the underlying 
popular support of the Progressive movement are complex and contested. One source was a 
public perception of existing governments as both incompetent and corrupt, a complaint that 
became conceptually linked with personal vice (McCormick, 1981; Hays, 1964).  
As was the case more infamously for alcohol prohibition, Progressive reformers 
overestimated the power that government had to improve people’s morality (as they saw it) 
and underestimated the unintended consequences of criminalising a profitable commercial 
sector. Prohibitions of any trade create opportunities for rent seeking for the privilege of 
supplying it (Paul and Wilhite, 1994). Absent formal legal recognition of the rights and 
property necessary to engage in trade, that competition will be settled with the threat and use 
of violence. Hence, criminalisation did not eliminate sex work but rather led to its 
consolidation under the control of organised crime (Simowitz, 2013). This contributes to the 
association that sex work has with violence and abuse.  
Contemporary approaches to sex work suppression tend to use the label abolition rather than 
prohibition. The label ‘abolition’ keeps the deliberate allusion to the slavery abolitionist 
movement of the 19th century. As with prohibition in the 19th and early 20th century, religious 
groups are prominent supporters of an abolitionist model. In addition, secular radical 
feminists, who critique patriarchy and heterosexism in other aspects of society, frequently 
support the abolitionist model (Weitzer, 2009, p.20; Phoenix, 2009). Rather than 
conceptualising sex workers as fallen women who bring moral degradation and disorder to a 
community, while also being a vector for communicative diseases, this model presents sex 
workers primarily as victims forced through both circumstances and criminal exploiters into 
the sector (See, for example, Farley, 2004; Jeffreys, 2009; Raymond, 2013). Rather than 
deserving criminalisation, sex workers need help exiting the industry and formulating new 
work and life identities. Moreover, proponents of sex work suppression argue that legal sex 
work encourages violence against women and lowers the status of women in society more 
generally (Weitzer, 2009). 
A concrete example of this approach to policy is what has become known as the Nordic or 
Swedish model whereby buyers of sex are criminalised while sex workers themselves are 
encouraged to engage with social services (Vuolajärvi, 2019; McMenzie et al., 2019). The 
aim of this approach is to ‘end demand’ as it is argued that it is the preferences of men to use 
sexual services that drive the development of the sector. A practical issue with the Nordic 
model is that it renders all clients of sex workers offenders, and makes sex workers willing 
victims to a crime. It criminalises the exchange by targeting one of the parties engaged in it. 
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This inevitably creates an antagonistic relationship between sex workers and police because 
the authorities are attempting to disrupt the transaction. This means that sex workers often 
need to hide their activities from authorities. They may struggle to integrate their work with 
access to mainstream public and financial services (Lister, 2018). Sex workers cannot take 
steps to establish more durable arrangements that may better ensure their safety. Bernstein 
(2012) argues that one important contributor to contemporary abolitionist discourse is what 
she identifies as carceral feminism: this is the use punitive criminal justice policies in an 
attempt to achieve feminist policy goals such as gender equality. 
A conceptual challenge for abolitionists is that, unlike the institutions of slavery, many 
individuals participating in sex work (or who have participated in sex work) deny that they 
have been forced. Some describe sex work as a positive feature of their lives, while many 
describe it pragmatically as the best form of paid work available to them in what may be a 
range of limited options (Abel, 2014; Mac and Smith, 2018). Historical slavery abolitionists 
contended with defenders of slavery, those who justified and naturalised the practice, but 
generally not with people who contested where slavery existed. This suggests that the 
abolitionist model does not capture the range of understandings of the practice of sex work. 
A plausible argument in favour of the suppression model is that legal sex work between 
consenting adults expands the sex industry and encourages coercive trafficking while making 
it more difficult for police to detect it (Farley, 2004; Raymond, 2013). Some evidence, 
focused on comparing different approaches to sex work regulation in Europe, supports this 
position (Jakobsson and Kotsadam, 2013). Potential weaknesses with this argument is that the 
definition of human trafficking itself is driven by policymakers and law enforcement rather 
than individuals involved in sex work (Agustín, 2006, 2002). When discovered committing 
immigration violations, individuals might be placed under pressure to identify officially as 
trafficking victims to avoid criminal penalties (Chapkis, 2003). 
Suppression approaches are remarkably prevalent globally (Armstrong, 2020). Considered 
through this lens, criminalisation of technology platforms that facilitate sex work follows 
logically. If it is impossible for people to be a sex worker consensually, then it follows that 
the client and any involved third-party is responsible for serious crime. Classically, third 
parties are presented as violent pimps. Third-party platforms that permit the advertising of 
sex work must really be facilitating the practices of pimps, allowing them to sell access to the 
people they control more effectively. On this account, permitting more exploitation cannot be 
to the advantage of those who are exploited. 
Permissive models 
There are more permissive approaches to sex work which are occasionally implemented or at 
least influence policy reforms. These tend to be premised on the notion that sex workers have 
capacity for rational agency and so engage in trade because they feel it benefits them when 
compared to other possible courses of action. Criminalisation restricts their available legal 
options and so risks putting them in a worse position than they otherwise would be. 
Criminalisation also increases stigma associated with sex work even if it only directly targets 
clients (Bettio et al., 2017). Permissive models recognise that there are severe personal risks, 
as well as social costs, associated with the sex industry. The purpose of law and regulation on 
this account is to allow people to pursue their own ends as they see them while preventing 
harm to others. This means protecting individuals from violence, theft or deception in the 
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process of participation in sex work, and the prevention of communicable diseases. The 
modern impetus for harm reduction approaches was driven by the AIDS epidemic where the 
social costs of failure to provide sex workers with access to public health services were 
particularly salient (Rekart, 2005; Cusick, 2006). 
Although each policy has unique characteristics, two labels help to differentiate possible 
models. The first is legalisation. This model acknowledges the welfare value of providing 
safe spaces to conduct sex work but proposes that the various nuisances and risks associated 
with the industry require special regulation. This is often through requiring sex workers to 
register and undertake regular health checks as well as restriction of business to licensed 
venues in limited locations that can be easily inspected by public officials. The intention is 
often to keep visible signs of the sex industry away from residential areas and areas used by 
families. Versions of this model can be found in Germany and the Netherlands. It is also 
present in a few counties of Nevada, which license some brothels but not other forms of 
direct sex work (Wakefield and Brents, 2020). 
The disadvantages of a legalisation model parallel those found in other licensing and 
regulation frameworks. There is a trade-off between increased safety and security and costs 
of compliance. If the costs of compliance are too high, then some sex workers may decide to 
opt out of the legal framework. In addition, legislative models often discriminate between 
settled citizens and migrants. Legalisation may be introduced to achieve other policy goals 
than the welfare of sex workers and clients, such as immigration control and making sex 
work less visible to the public (Hubbard et al., 2008). Supposed legalisation policies can act 
as a cover for suppression (Scoular, 2010). 
The second label is decriminalisation. This model is premised on the idea that sex work is 
close enough to other forms of work and exchange such that the policy does not require 
compulsory licensing (Mac and Smith, 2018). On this account. the external costs of the sex 
industry are insufficient to justify regulation beyond standard legal remedies found in civil 
society. The closest example to an implemented version of decriminalisation is in New 
Zealand where sex workers are encouraged to use licensed brothels but there are no penalties 
for operating independently (Armstrong and Abel, 2020). For both legalisation and 
decriminalisation models, the intention is not to eliminate sex work but rather to shift 
individuals working within the sex industry away from coercive, high-risk practices and 
towards healthier, safer, more secure and more socially integrated practices. 
Identifying the performance of different legal frameworks is a challenging task. Relevant data 
is harder to collect than for many ordinary markets, especially in the case of direct sex work 
since most transactions are unrecorded and conducted privately. Observations of crimes like 
violence against women and human trafficking often reflect enforcement priorities and so 
comparisons between different legal regimes are contestable. Nevertheless, some recent 
empirical research suggests there are generally welfare benefits to permissive models. When 
directly compared, consensual sex work is more profitable and easier to manage than coerced 
sex work (Marcus et al., 2016). This suggests, in principle, that a sufficiently permissive 
regime that respects the rights and welfare of sex workers and their clients are likely to be 
more efficient than coercive alternatives. They could replace more coercive forms of adult 
sex work. Moreover, Cunningham and Shah (2018) provide some evidence from the U.S that 
points in favour specifically of the decriminalisation of adult sex work. They exploited the 
plausibly exogenous decriminalisation of indoor sex work in Rhode Island, imposed 
unexpectedly by a District Court judge. They found that decriminalisation allowed sex 
10 
 
workers to adopt safer working practices associated with a substantial reduction in rape 
victimisation and prevalence of sexually transmitted infections. Converse evidence, exploring 
a recent, initially unexpected, criminalisation of sex work in one district in East Java, 
Indonesia, found that criminalisation was associated with increased sexually-transmitted 
infections and lower incomes for former sex workers, impeding their capacity to support their 
families (Cameron et al., 2020). The next section introduces the transaction costs framework, 
explains how online platforms reduce transaction costs and applies this framework to sex 
work. 
Technology platforms and transaction costs 
How can the role of technology platforms in changing the sex industry best be understood? 
The range of impacts and changes in the sector can be explained effectively by thinking 
through the harms that sex workers face as transaction costs. The concept of transaction costs 
is central to the contemporary study of economic organization. A basic premise of new 
institutional economics is that a great deal of variation between successful enterprises, and 
indeed successful economies, is explained by the extent to which organizations, institutions 
and social norms reduce transaction costs (North, 1990; Williamson, 1985; Coase, 1937). 
Transaction costs are the burdens associated with engaging in exchange. If the burdens are 
too high, exchanges that are, in principle, mutually beneficial will not take place, vitiating 
potential welfare gains and productivity improvements that would otherwise be achieved 
through specialization and coordination.  
The transaction costs framework has been fruitfully applied to the development of online 
platforms, especially the emergence of the sharing economy (Munger, 2018; Rochet and 
Tirole, 2006; Oranburg and Palagashvili, 2020). Lobel (2018) offers a useful typology of 
transaction costs that platforms can help at various stages of an exchange: 1) search costs 2) 
bargaining costs, and 3) policing and enforcing costs. Search costs refers to the time, 
resources and effort required for two parties interested in trading to find each other. 
Bargaining costs refer to the time and resources it takes to settle on a price that is mutually 
agreeable and beneficial to both parties. Policing and enforcement costs refers to costs of 
securing one’s person and property, as well as ensuring that other parties supply their side of 
the agreement without violence or nuisance. 
Platforms such as Uber and Lyft offer paradigmatic examples of how platforms can reduce 
these types of transaction costs. Their smartphone apps that link to their platforms reduce 
search, bargaining and policing costs by using the GPS locations of drivers and riders to 
match much more efficiently than hailing for a ride on the street, estimate the full cost of the 
journey in advance and prior registration to identify bad actors. This result is more driving 
hours are spent with a passenger than with a taxicab system (Cramer and Krueger, 2016) and 
an observable increase in consumer surplus (Cohen et al., 2016). The impact of ridesharing 
on crime, road fatalities and other social costs is currently controversial with some studies 
identifying indirect benefits, others costs (Barrios et al., 2020; Dills and Mulholland, 2018; 
Morrison et al., 2018). There may be scope for self-regulation or municipal regulation to 
reduce these social costs (Cohen and Sundararajan, 2015). On the other hand, the welfare 
benefits of the greater convenience and lower costs associated with such platforms should not 
be overlooked. As is now shown, this explanation for the emergence and value of platforms 
as applied to sharing platforms is a helpful lens through which to consider sex work. 
Applying the transaction costs framework to sex work 
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A rich empirical literature identifies many of the risks and harms that sex workers face that 
can be considered within a transactions cost framework (Connelly et al., 2018). Because of 
the extra-legal nature of much sex work, the associated transaction costs can be much higher 
than in other sectors. For example, Sanders and Campbell (2007) draw on accounts of indoor 
sex workers to establish what sort of risks they face. They found that key risks associated 
with their workplace were robbery, non-negotiated acts, removal of condoms, rude and 
disruptive behaviour and underpayment. The risks are high, but this also means that online 
platforms do not have to be even as sophisticated as a service such as Uber while still 
substantially reducing costs compared to relevant alternatives.  
There are several ways in which platforms can reduce transaction costs associated with sex 
work (Sanders et al., 2020). They can lower the transaction costs associated with an existing 
approach to sex work; they can lower the costs for indirect sex work, thus allowing sex 
workers to switch into safer parts of the sector; and they create new forms of indirect sex 
work with lower transaction costs to traditional forms. The facilitation of direct sex work is 
the most controversial and prompted the passing of FOSTA-SESTA so is an appropriate 
element on which to focus. Online platforms help reduce all three kinds of transaction costs 
associated with direct sex work (Sanders et al., 2017). Public marketing of sex work is 
usually discouraged or outright prohibited. This means that sex workers must rely on 
ephemeral forms of advertising. This includes waiting or walking on public streets where sex 
workers and clients are known to meet, or using discreet ads left in public places such as 
phone booths. Alternatively, they may rely on paid third parties (‘pimps’ or ‘madams’) to 
attract and assess clients (Horning and Marcus, 2018; Marcus et al., 2019). Online platforms 
provide a virtual focal point where sex workers can advertise, and potential clients can search 
for available opportunities. This substantially reduces the search costs of the two parties. This 
allows sex workers to build less ephemeral and more accessible professional profiles 
allowing them eventually to set higher prices for specialised services or become more 
selective about their clients (Jones, 2015, p.562). 
Bargaining often presents a point of vulnerability for sex worker and client. Conducted on the 
street, both may have little time to agree the exchange, and for the sex worker to assess the 
true intent of the client and their ability to pay, without attracting unwanted attention by 
police or other members of the public. By contrast, an online platform allows indicative 
prices for services to be advertised in advance and for bargaining to take place in a more 
relaxed and less dangerous context through discreet private messaging. Prominent examples 
of platforms that facilitate this improved search and bargaining for direct sex work have 
included Craigslist, Backpage, RedBook and The Erotic Review before they were shutdown 
(Steuer, 2015). They give sex workers an opportunity to exchange information with clients 
through private, safer messaging services, thus allowing them to become familiar with each 
other before having to commit to an in-person meeting. 
Policing and enforcement are chronic challenges for direct sex work because formal legal 
regimes generally do not enforce agreements between sex workers and clients. Moreover, 
since both parties are engaging in what both public and police generally see as illicit activity, 
they are less likely to report being the victim of theft, deception or violence (Lister, 2018). In 
this context, extra-legal mechanisms for establishing trust between parties, especially 
reputation within a community of known clients and sex workers, are much more important 
than in licensed or permitted industries. Sex workers take steps within their constrained 
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resources and opportunities to improve their security. They may use informal social networks 
to identify clients who are non-violent and will reliably pay (Sanders et al., 2017). They can 
share knowledge between trusted associates to identify potentially dangerous clients. Indeed, 
one non-profit platform based in the United Kingdom, National Ugly Mugs, initially 
launched by the British Home Office, has harnessed this informal practice among sex 
workers to encourage information sharing about bad clients (Connelly et al., 2018; Sanders et 
al., 2016).  
When it comes to engaging with individuals not previously known to a sex worker, clients 
might be required to produce a note or letter of introduction from other sex workers known 
within the profession or give references that can vouch for their character. Online platforms 
facilitate these strategies by making it much easier to share information about clients and 
expand the network of trusted parties. Some platforms encourage sex workers to exchange 
information with each other, thus spreading information about bad or dangerous clients much 
more effectively over large distances. One platform, Preferred411, specializes in connecting 
people with verified identities (Rigg, 2010; Zukerman, 2011). Other platforms encourage 
clients of sex workers to interact with each other and share information in online forms. An 
important feature of these interactions is an education of novice clients in proper conduct 
with regards to contacting sex workers and risk-reduction methods, especially in areas where 
sex work is illegal (Horswill and Weitzer, 2018). Clients communicate expectations about the 
process of verification and promote a common moral framework to each other which 
contributes to safer transactions (Sanders et al., 2020, p.31). 
The availability of these platforms has allowed many sex workers to transition from 
exchanges on the street to indoor areas and to rely less on risky practices (Cunningham and 
Kendall, 2011). Tentative evidence suggests that the availability of Craigslist, for a time the 
most known platform for sexual services, substantially reduced the number of female victims 
of homicide (Cunningham et al., 2019).  
The consequences of suppression 
The available evidence suggests that the growth of online platforms has generally been 
beneficial to the welfare of sex workers. Due to the still recent nature of the shift in policy 
towards the deliberate suppression of platforms, formal observations of the policy’s effects 
have yet to become available. However, attempts to regulate online platforms to exclude the 
facilitation of sex work appear to have had negative consequences at least according to 
research conducted within the sex work community. A survey of sex workers in Rhode Island 
revealed that the loss of online opportunities for advertising had to led to the re-adoption of 
more dangerous working practices (Jackson and Heineman, 2018). A survey of street-based 
sex workers based in Massachusetts reported increases in income instability and a reduction 
in personal agency as a result of the passing of FOSTA-SESTA (Blunt and Wolf, 2020). In 
addition to loss of advertising, sex workers fear that the platforms they used for reporting 
violent clients come under the broad prohibition that FOSTA-SESTA uses. Sex workers in 
New York have reported being more likely to be targeted by police for ‘loitering’ because of 
their greater reliance on street advertisement following the reduction of online advertising 
opportunity (Witt, 2018).  
A broader survey found that a majority of sex workers had recently been subject to threats of 
violence, exploitation or coercive attempts to obtain free services, some from people 
attempting to establish themselves as pimps, which some respondents associated directly with 
the passing of FOSTA-SESTA (Peterson et al., 2019). This aligns with personal accounts of 
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sex workers being compelled to return to using pimps that they had previously found to be 
unnecessary for conducting their business when it became internet-based (Cole, 2018). This 
is suggestive that FOSTA-SESTA has undermined some of the crowding-out of coercive 
practices in the sector that platform had facilitated. For some sex workers, the next best 
option to relying on platforms is not exiting the sex industry, but continuing in the sector 
while engaging in risky practices that attract the attention of coercive actors. These are 
‘inelastic’ sex workers who have relatively unattractive outside options (cf. Cunningham et 
al., 2019). Although direct evidence is not yet available, presumably some ‘elastic’ sex 
workers were encouraged to exit the sector for less lucrative, but safer, alternatives.  
FOSTA-SESTA also compounded pre-existing discrimination against sex workers on 
mainstream financial technology platforms. Sex workers have to disguise the kind of work 
they are engaged and are vulnerable to being removed from a platform, often losing earned 
income in the process. With limited access to mainstream financial platforms, many sex 
workers have resorted to more specialised platforms with much higher transaction fees (Blunt 
et al., 2020). Moreover, due to the global reach of Internet platforms, the loss of Backpage 
and US-based platforms had impacts outside US jurisdictions (Peterson et al., 2019). For 
example, many sex workers in New Zealand had used Backpage for advertising before it was 
shutdown. When that option was removed, some sex workers were compelled back into 
working in brothels. Others attempted to use New Zealand-based online platforms as an 
alternative but these often had an inadequate number of clients to maintain a secure income 
(Tichenor, 2020). One alternative platform enforces a restrictive exclusivity requirement on 
sex workers while Backpage had not. 
These reports are consistent with the transaction costs account of platform goods. The 
prohibition and curtailment of platform services for sex workers has generated costs in terms 
of reduced income and security for sex workers. In some cases, sex workers have made 
adjustments that maintain an online presence but often by adopting inferior products. 
Policy Implications 
What policy implications can be drawn from the transaction costs approach to understanding 
the sex work sector and the role of online platforms? Generally, this account suggests that 
permissive approaches, and especially decriminalisation, are likely to have welfare benefits 
for both sex workers and clients. Our key observation is that granting rights to engage in sex 
work generates opportunities for both market participants and entrepreneurs to innovate and 
contract. This means that, while there are well-documented costs and externalities associated 
with the sector, these problems are not inevitable but can be progressively ameliorated when 
the autonomy of participants is respected. Decriminalisation does not imply acceptance of 
violence and exploitation, merely recognition that effective solutions are likely to come from 
bottom-up experimentation within the sector and sector self-governance facilitated by 
platforms. 
Our reasoning for this is that much sex work takes place due to the mutual benefit derived by 
both sex worker and client. By contrast, violent, abusive and exploitative events are cases of 
disequilibrium outcomes (cf. Shortland, 2019). They are not intended outcomes of faithful 
participants. Evidence for this can be found in the way that many street sex workers describe 
passers-by, police and other people who morally object to their presence, rather than clients, 
as primary sources of violence (Armstrong, 2014, 2019; Sanders et al., 2020, p.34). 
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Offenders, of course, may pose as clients in order to access sex workers but with the real 
intention of attacking or robbing them (Kinnell, 2006). This presents a parallel problem to 
theft or fraud, or risk of violence, in other market exchanges. Such outcomes can be reduced 
and avoided by strengthening institutional mechanisms that allow workers to differentiate 
genuine clients and mutual co-operators from potential threats. Moreover, experienced clients 
tend to be less likely to be arrested suggesting that, as transactions become regularised, both 
sides in the exchange are likely to benefit without disturbing the community around them 
(Monto and Milrod, 2014; Sanders et al., 2020, p.31). 
As indicated above, one contributor to the relatively high prevalence of violent victimization 
of sex workers is the lack of official recognition of sex work as work entitled to ordinary civil 
legal protections. When police refrain from targeting sex workers or their clients, then 
information sharing between the sector and authorities have facilitated sex worker protection 
and successful deterrence of bad actors (Penfold et al., 2004). However, such policy 
successes are limited when implemented based on the discretion of authorities and without 
legislative support. Without the recognition of formal rights for sex workers, such as the right 
to rent or own premises where their activities can be legally conducted, it is possible for 
cooperation to be undermined by a change in police policy. Sex workers face regime 
uncertainty when engaging with authorities. This deters them from adopting longer term 
strategies that might better ensure their security as they may, at little notice, be compelled 
change their level of visibility or move to a new location. 
Malicious activity and fraud occur in all online marketplaces because they are open-access 
and facilitate exchange among strangers (Garg and Nilizadeh, 2013). Marketplaces can be 
used to sell dangerous or stolen goods. Online marketplaces for sex work face parallel 
problems, the most extreme being cases of human trafficking. On the other hand, online 
platforms aiming at supplying legitimate goods frequently benefit from offering user 
protections (Tadelis, 2016). For example, eBay and PayPal became popular platforms by 
offering additional protections to buyers and sellers (Trautman, 2016). This is the function 
that Craigslist adopted for sex work before state authorities pushed it out of the sector 
(Cunningham and Kendall, 2016; Cunningham et al., 2019; Otravec, 2014). The main 
difference is that online platforms serving sex workers moved into a sector where authorities 
had previously discouraged formal mechanisms to manage risk and exclude malicious actors. 
The suppression approach to platforms that the U.S. Government has adopted has 
progressively reduced the number of openly competing platforms in the sector, and, 
moreover, pushed more well-known brands like Craigslist out first. This has left sex workers 
with fewer options and likely made it harder for platforms to compete explicitly on safety and 
trust. 
When common carrier protections are in place, cooperation between online platforms and 
police authorities, as well as NGOs specialising in human trafficking, is easier to establish. 
For example, Backpage was able to supply evidence used to prosecute bad actors such as 
human traffickers when it was in operation (Q, 2018). Thus, the common carrier protection 
regime that Reno vs ACLU helped inaugurate did not only facilitate commerce. By allowing 
online platforms to inspect and filter content, it permitted some regularisation of previously 
disorderly markets. Furthermore, decriminalisation of platforms that facilitate sex work 
would permit competition between platforms. For these reasons, FOSTA-SESTA should be 
amended to better distinguish the facilitation of consensual sex work and coercive sex work, 
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and protect platforms that serve sex workers that act in good faith to prevent sexual 
exploitation from prosecution. This should be aligned with broader reforms to decriminalise 
sex work under national and state laws. 
Broader parallels with coercion in labor markets 
As we describe above, issues surrounding sex work have often been segregated from 
mainstream scholarly discussion. This has led to the facilitation of sex work through online 
platforms being presented as a unique problem that requires its own analysis and legal 
constraints. What we have shown is that applying a transaction costs framework, familiar 
from the analysis of economic activity in other sectors, can help de-mystify the specific 
challenges that sex workers face and the role that intermediaries play in reducing frictions to 
voluntary mutually beneficial exchanges. 
Similarly, explaining the prevalence of coercion in sex work and how to reduce it can be 
helped by including it within a broader understanding of coercive labor practices. Unfree 
labor is a substantial feature of the modern economy, observed particularly in the global 
garment trade (LeBaron and Phillips, 2019). It presents an urgent ethical and legal challenge, 
albeit one that has achieved less salience politically because the production of clothing is not 
so easily moralised or sensationalised as sex work. It is a product that everyone needs and so 
there is no minority consumer group to stigmatise. A general prediction is that the existence 
of outside options for workers will reduce the effectiveness, and therefore prevalence, of 
coercive practices (Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2011). This aligns with the evidence we have 
presented suggesting that increasing opportunities for sex workers may not necessarily cause 
them to exit the sector, but does allow them to reduce risks of violence and operate without 
pimps. 
Research into the political economy of unfree labor sometimes follows a Marxist paradigm 
that explains workplace coercion as determined by the interests of capital, or a neo-classical 
paradigm that explains workplace coercion as a result of market failure. Both tend to 
highlight the lack of state regulation and the power of business as the underlying cause. More 
recent research, however, highlights the significance of political institutions not just for 
addressing the problem of unfree labour but sometimes facilitating it (LeBaron and Phillips, 
2019). Examples of facilitation can include the removal of labor protections and the 
prevention of legal migration and border enforcement, as well as explicitly state-sanctioned 
or controlled labor coercion such as in prisons and concentration camps. Seen through this 
lens, state prohibitions on sex workers working together, forming their own trade associations 
and utilising protective strategies availed by platforms are examples of governments, 
intentionally or not, facilitating spaces for coercive labor. 
Our account also aligns with assessments of the ethics of poor labor conditions and attempts 
to reform them in the absence of understanding background conditions or relevant 
alternatives for workers. For example, Powell (2014) critically explores widely publicised 
campaigns against sweatshops in global supply chains; he finds that the wages and conditions 
cited as exploitative are generally superior to typical working conditions in countries where 
sweatshops are located. Moreover, sweatshops can be instrumental in generating sustained 
economic growth in undeveloped economies. On our account, it is important to distinguish 
between poor working conditions that result from coercion and those resulting from choice 
within the economic and social constraints that workers face. Seldom can a reduction of 
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worker choice lead either to superior economic outcomes or improvement in social status 
(Zwolinski, 2012). Increasing choice, through institutional reform or the distribution of 
resources to the disadvantaged, is more likely to be successful. Similarly, the selling of sexual 
services on Internet platforms makes the sector, including examples of poor working 
conditions within it, more salient and open to public criticism. However, shutting them down 
and pushing sex work to the periphery will still harm workers. 
Conclusion 
What does a humane approach to the regulation of sex work on online platforms look like? 
Sex work is a controversial issue, one that has come to be associated with fundamental 
debates about the place of women in society, the problem of gender-based violence and the 
extent to which commerce should be permitted for the provision of intimacy. This is despite 
empirical observations that indicate the sector is much more complex and diverse than a 
simple gendered lens presumes. Empirical research highlights the capacity of many sex 
workers for personal agency, as well as the variety of people engaged in sex work beyond the 
classic gender divide. Many sex workers are neither coerced nor behave irrationally (Tullock 
and McKenzie, 1975). They are often pursuing deliberate ends within the economic and 
social constraints that they face, including the stigma that society attaches to their choice of 
occupation (Bettio et al., 2017). To supress sex work outright is a denial of autonomy. 
As is the case in other personal services, there is substantial evidence that online platforms 
serving sex workers have helped to increase their income and welfare by lowering transaction 
costs and especially decreasing their reliance on risky practices to attract business. For these 
reasons, many sex workers protested the closure of Backpage and the passing of FOSTA-
SESTA into law which forced many of them to adopt less safe working practices (Q, 2018). 
There is a distressing lack of sex workers’ voices in local and national policy processes, itself 
a reflection of the continued stigma attached to the occupation. A better approach would 
allow online platforms that choose to serve sex workers to maintain the same protections as 
common carriers that mainstream platforms currently enjoy. Moreover, providing legal 
recognition and protection to both sex workers and the platforms they use would generate 
opportunities for collaboration between police authorities and the sex industry to deter 
coercive and unsafe practices. 
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